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The American Exclusionary Rule Experience 
GeraldS. Reamey, San Antonio 
There are many exclusionary rules in the American criminal justice system, t as 
there are in virtually all legal systems. The one "exclusionary rule" that is best 
known and has proven to be most controversial, however, is the rule that prohibits 
the admission of evidence that was obtained as a result of some unlawful search or 
seizure by the police.2 This rule gives effect to the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution,3 the guarantee that citizens will be free from "unrea-
sonable" searches and seizures by the govemment.4 
Other rules, also properly called "exclusionary rules", prevent the admission at 
trial of evidence that is unreliable or irrelevant.S In fact, largely because of the 
American jury system, an entire body of law exists regarding the rules of evi-
dence. Lengthy codes are devoted to this subject,6 and thousands of opinions from 
appellate courts annually decide legal issues arising under the rules of evidence. 
Many of these rules, especially the ones designed to exclude unreliable evidence, 
are intended to keep laypersons on the jury from hearing, and being influenced by, 
potentially untruthful or inaccurate evidence. 
The rule excluding evidence obtained illegally by the police is different, however, 
and that difference is a source of the controversy surrounding it. While exclusion-
See George E. Dix, Nonconstitutional Exclusionary Rules in Criminal Procedure, 27 
Am.Crim.L.Rev.53 (1989). 
2 See Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
3 The Fourth Amendment states: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. U.S. Const. Amend. rv. 
4 The Fourth Amendment, like other provisions of the U.S. Constitution, applies to govern-
mental or "state" action. Unreasonable searches or seizures by private persons are not 
within the reach of the Amendment. See Wayne R. Lafave! Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Pro-
cedure§ 3.1(h) (2d ed. 1992); U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (private party search 
was not a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes). 
5 Evidentiary rules prevent the admission of testimony that is "hearsay", or the use of copies 
of documents when originals are available. As is true in most legal systems, a broad prohi-
bition on irrelevant evidence exists. 
6 See, e.g., Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 U.S.C.A. Rules Appendix. 
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ary rules prohibiting the introduction of unreliable or irrelevant evidence obvi-
ously advance the truth-finding function of a court, the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule does just the opposite. It excludes evidence that often is highly trust-
worthy and directly relevant to the guilt of the accused person. 7 The effect of the 
rule is to hide from the court (judge or jury) that which may be essential to deter-
mining the truth of the criminal accusation. And when this happens, when a judge 
orders evidence suppressed because of police misconduct, everyone knows of the 
existence and value of the suppressed evidence. 8 As a result of the exclusion, it 
often is impossible for the state to continue with its prosecution because the un-
availability of that evidence makes it impossible for the state to prove all elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
It has been said that when the exclusionary rule is applied, everyone sees the 
"price" that American society pays for enforcement of its constitutional protec-
tion.9 If a police officer unconstitutionally forces open a car and discovers a dead 
body inside, evidence associated with the body is inadmissible. The murderer 
goes free because "the constable has blundered". to 
Such a result leads observers to ask why Americans have such a rule. 11 Nowhere 
does the United States Constitution specify that an exclusionary rule be used to 
enforce the Fourth Amendment. I2 Nor does our legal history support such a 
rule.I3 A majority of justices on the U.S. Supreme Court came to believe, how-
ever, first in federal criminal cases, 14 then in state cases also, that the Fourth 
Amendment guarantee was an empty promise without some effective enforcement 
7 See John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 Stanford L. Rev. 1027, 1028 
(1974) (" ... any rule which makes rationally probative and often vital evidence against a 
criminal defendant inadmissible in his criminal prosecution flies in the face of crime con-
trol values".). 
8 See Kaplan (note 7) at 1037. 
9 See Kaplan (note 7) at 1037. 
10 This famous phrase was first used by Judge Benjamin Cardozo in People v. Defore, 242 
N.Y. at 21 , 150 N.E. at 587. 
II See Kaplan (note 7) at 1031-1032 (other countries reject such a rule}, citing remarks of 
Lord Widgery, Lord Chief Justice of England, American Bar Association Convention, July 
16, 1971, reported in N.Y. Times, July 17, 1971 , at I, col. 3. 
12 See Akhil Reed A mar, Against Exclusion (Except to Protect Truth or Prevent Privacy Vio-
lations), 20 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 457, 459 (1997). 
13 See Amar (note 12) at 459. 
14 See Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383 (1914). For many years, the Supreme Court refused to 
extend the exclusionary rule to the states, holding that while the Fourth Amendment's 
guarantees were enforceable against the states, the exclusionary rule was not required as 
the enforcement mechanism. See Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
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mechanism. IS While the exclusionary rule is not mentioned in the Constitution,16 
they believed it was necessary to give effect to the privacy right that is men-
tioned.J7 
In Mapp v. Ohio, IS the U.S. Supreme Court decided in 1961 to require the Ameri-
can states to apply the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. The Court explained 
that two important interests required adoption of the rule. The first of these, and 
the one that continues to be used by the Supreme Court to justifY the exclusionary 
sanction, is deterrence of police misconduct. If the police will not be able to profit 
from an illegal search, they will have no reason to search illegally. The effective-
ness of exclusion as a deterrent to this kind of misconduct has never been demon-
strated empirically, although there is considerable anecdotal evidence that the rule 
produces some level of deterrence.19 
The second rationale for the rule is the so-called "judicial integrity" argument.20 
By using (admitting) evidence known to have been obtained illegally, the court, a 
state institution, gives its tacit approval to the methods used by the police that 
produced the evidence being offered. If, as Justice Brandeis wrote in Olmstead v. 
United States, the government is the "potent, the omnipresent teacher",21 it should 
teach by its example that illegal police methods are unacceptable, as is the evi-
dence that those methods produce. 
15 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
16 Opponents of the exclusionary rule continue to argue that this lack of express constitu-
tional authority undermines the rule. Proponents of the rule note in response that other, 
more readily accepted procedural rights also have been inferred from the language of the 
Constitution without raising any serious question about their validity. See Yale Kamisar, A 
Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 15 Crim.L.Bull. 5, 16-17 (1979). 
17 This position was adopted even by Justice Hugo Black who was known for his literal 
reading of the commands of the Constitution. In his concurring opinion in Mapp, Justice 
Black wrote that, "when the Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable searches and 
seizures is considered together with the Fifth Amendment's ban against compelled self-
incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges which not only justifies but actually requires 
the exclusionary rule". Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
18 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
19 Even Professor John Kaplan, one of the rule's harshest critics, conceded that "the rule does 
seem to have some effect on police behavior". Kaplan (note 7) at 1033. 
20 The policy of judicial integrity is found in Mapp v. Ohio, as it was in Weeks: "The crimi-
nal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a gov-
ernment more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the 
charter of its own existence." 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961). 
21 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928). Justice Brandeis' famous passage is: "Our government is the 
potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its ex-
ample ... If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites 
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." ld. 
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The Supreme Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio meant that the states were no 
longer free to exclude illegally obtained evidence or not, as they chose. Every 
state court in the nation was required after Mapp to suppress evidence obtained in 
violation of the U.S. Constitution. While many states had adopted some form of 
exclusionary rule in their own courts, many others had rejected exclusion as a 
remedy for police misconduct. Under the American system of federalism, this 
meant that before 1961 a federal prosecutor could not use evidence obtained ille-
gally because the exclusionary rule applied in federal courts, but, at least in a state 
with no exclusionary rule, the federal prosecutor could hand over that evidence to 
the state prosecutor, and it could be used to convict a defendant of a state crime in 
state court.22 After the decision in Mapp v. Ohio, this was no longer possible be-
cause illegally obtained evidence was inadmissible in every court in the United 
States. 
The extension of the exclusionary rule to state courts signaled an explosion of 
Fourth Amendment litigation at all levels of the American criminal justice system. 
In the years following Mapp, courts were forced to examine and explain every 
aspect of search and seizure law, and the resulting body of law is virtually unman-
ageable both in scope and complexity. One of the first issues raised, even before 
Mapp v. Ohio was decided, was how far the "taint" of police misconduct could 
reach.23 
If, for example, police officers illegally enter a person's house and find narcotics, 
it is clear that the drugs are the "fruit" of the illegal entry and are tainted by it. 
They are inadmissible in the trial of the possessor. But if that person told the offi-
cers that he obtained the drugs from another person, and acting on that informa-
tion, the police obtained a warrant and found drugs in a search of the other per-
son's house, are those drugs admissible? Or are they the so-called "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" because the police would not have discovered the drugs if they 
had not illegally entered the first person's house? 
22 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-658 (1961). The reverse of this practice was the 
admission in federal court of evidence unconstitutionally seized by state officers and given 
to federal agents. Under the so-called "silver platter" doctrine (because the evidence was 
handed to the federal government on a "silver platter"), federal courts admitted evidence 
obtained by state officers even if the way in which it was seized would have caused it to be 
excluded had it been obtained by federal officers. This practice was eliminated in Elkins v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). 
23 See, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
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Complicated lines of cases developed addressing questions of this sort.24 If the 
police acted illegally in some respect, a court is forced to consider whether the 
evidence before it is tainted by that illegality, or whether the evidence came from 
some "independent source" .25 Prior illegality (or "taint") does not always render 
evidence inadmissible. Sometimes the police misconduct is just too far removed 
from the discovery of the evidence being offered to justifY exclusion. And some-
times the police obtain evidence in a legal way even though they did some illegal 
act. In these cases, the exclusionary rule does not apply. 
As the American experience with the rule has lengthened, and as the Supreme 
Court has become increasingly conservative, the exclusionary rule has become 
more limited in its reach. The Court has restricted the classes of persons who may 
claim a Fourth Amendment violation;26 it has created exceptions to the exclusion-
ary rule;27 and it has even redefined the language of the Fourth Amendment to 
permit more intrusive police investigations.28 
The debate about the exclusionary rule usually is conducted by comparing the 
"costs" of the rule with, and weighing them against, the "benefits" the rule 
brings.29 On the "cost" side of the argument, the most compelling argument is that 
24 See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
25 See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
26 Persons who do not have "standing" to complain of Fourth Amendment violations may not 
ask for or obtain suppression of evidence. Changes in the way in which standing is defined 
have restricted the availability of the exclusion remedy. See Gerald S. Reamey, Up in 
Smoke: Fourth Amendment Rights and the Burger Court, 45 Okla.L.Rev. 57, 77-80 
(1992). 
27 These include the "good faith" exception for evidence seized pursuant to a warrant when 
an officer could rely in objectively reasonable good faith on the validity of that warrant, 
see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and the "inevitable discovery" rule that 
permits admission of evidence that inevitably would have been discovered through lawful 
means. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
28 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (departure from individualized prob-
able cause for administrative searches); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968) (adoption of 
"reasonable suspicion" as standard for investigative detentions and limited weapons 
searches). For a discussion of the increasing use of "reasonableness" at the expense of 
"probable cause" in search and seizure cases, see Gerald S. Reamey, When "Special 
Needs" Meet Probable Cause: Denying the Devil Benefit of Law, 19 Hastings Const. L.Q. 
295, 300-322 (1992). 
29 The exclusionary rule has been described as "a judicially created remedy designed to safe-
guard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a per-
sonal constitutional right of the party aggrieved". United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 
(1974). This characterization suggests that the rule is not required by the Constitution, and 
must be justified by a cost-benefit analysis. See Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal 
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the rule results in criminals going free. Because the exclusionary rule is applied 
only after incriminating evidence has been seized, and because the evidence usu-
ally establishes that the accused is factually guilty, this "cost" is far more obvious 
than the cost of not employing an exclusionary rule.30 The American public seems 
to believe that the existence and use of such a rule results in many criminals going 
free, but that perception may not be accurate.31 
The exclusionary rule has its greatest impact in drug cases, probably because al-
most all drug cases involve search and seizure issues, and because the benefit to 
the defendant of exclusion is so much greater than in many other kinds of cases. 
For whatever reasons, one important study concludes that non-prosecution or non-
conviction due to application of the exclusionary rule occurs in between 2.8 and 
7.1% of drug cases.32 An often-cited 1979 study by the General Accounting Of-
fice of federal prosecutions found that only 0.4 % of all cases (not just drug cases) 
were not prosecuted because of search and seizure problems.33 A third study 
found evidence being excluded in less than 5 % of the cases in which a search 
warrant had been issued, and the exclusionary rule preventing conviction in just 
1.4% of those cases.34 These "costs" are not insignificant, but they do not com-
port with the perception that the exclusionary rule usually results in the "criminal 
going free because the constable has blundered". 
Critics point to other, hidden costs also. They charge that: 
1. The rule does not deter police misconduct because police officers believe the 
rule is illegitimate and that perjury (lying to the court) is therefore an accept-
able way to prevent the rule from being applied;35 
Procedure 325-326 (2d ed. 1997); Kaplan (note 7) at I 032 (argument against rule is that 
benefits are outweighed by costs). 
30 See Kaplan (note 7) at 1037. 
31 Professor John Kaplan, a critic of the exclusionary rule, conceded: "It is undeniably true ... 
that in practice the exclusionary rule rarely allows dangerous defendants to go free." Kap-
lan (note 7) at 1036. 
32 Dressler (note 29) at 333-334; Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and 
Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other 
Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 Am.B.Found.Res.J. 611. 
33 Dressler (note 29) at 334; Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting Office, lrnpact 
of the Exclusionary Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecutions 14 (1979) (Rep. No. GGD-79-
45). 
34 Dressler (note 29) at 334; Richard Van Duizend/L. Paul Sutton/Charlotte Carter, The 
Search Warrant Process: Preconceptions, Perceptions, and Practices I 08 (National Center 
for State Courts 1984). 
35 See Kaplan (note 7) at I 032. 
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2. Officers who try to perform their duties correctly often are unable to under-
stand the complexities of search and seizure law.36 Punishing them for mak-
ing the wrong choice does not deter intentional wrongdoing, but only causes 
the officers to hold the courts and the exclusionary rule in contempt; and 
3. The availability of the exclusionary rule diverts scarce resources from other 
defenses that might be investigated and raised, and it causes trial and appeals 
courts to spend much of their limited time deciding search and seizure issues 
rather than other, equally or more important issues of criminal responsibil-
ity.37 
On the "benefits" side of the analysis, opponents of the rule charge that it fails to 
live up to its promise, and that whatever benefits derive from its operation are 
outweighed by the associated costs. Among other things, they argue that: 
I . In cases in which the rule works to exclude evidence, police officers often are 
not told about the court's ruling or why their actions led to exclusion;38 
2. In the American criminal justice system, so many defendants plead guilty 
rather than have a trial that police actions in most cases are not subject to re-
view by the courts.39 Officers do not leam from their mistakes and are not 
deterred from misconduct in other cases; 
3. Other, more direct and effective ways exist to deter and punish police mis-
conduct. Officers may be subject to private civil actions for damages; they 
may be disciplined by their agencies; or they might be prosecuted if their ac-
tions violate some criminallaw;40 and 
4. The exclusionary rule does not operate in cases in which an illegal search or 
seizure uncovers no criminal evidence. Therefore it benefits only the factu-
ally guilty, and not the innocent.4I 
Those who favor the exclusionary rule must concede that it sometimes results in 
the factually guilty going free. They are quick to note, however, the studies 
36 See Kaplan (note 7) at 1033. 
37 See William J Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol'y 443, 453-454 (1997). 
38 See Kaplan (note 7) at 1032-1033. 
39 See Kaplan (note 7) at 1033. 
40 Former U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger proposed such alternatives to the 
exclusionary rule in his well-known dissenting opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Similar arguments continue 
to be made by respected scholars, and rejected by others. See A mar (note 12) at 463-464. 
41 See A mar (note 12) at 457-458 . 
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showing that this happens in a relatively small number of cases.42 Regarding the 
other "costs" described by the opponents of the rule, they usually respond as fol-
lows: 
I. It is impossible to know whether, or how often, police officers are deterred 
by fear that they will lose important criminal evidence. No survey or empiri-
cal study can determine the extent to which officers refrain from doing some 
illegal act, but anecdotal evidence and evidence of increased training and dis-
cipline demonstrate that fear of the exclusionary sanction exists, and that po-
lice officers and law enforcement agencies respond to that fear.43 
2. Search and seizure law is complex and difficult for many officers to fully 
comprehend, but the exclusionary rule provides a powerful incentive for 
them to learn what is constitutionally permissible, and what is not.44 Again, 
increased police training in search and seizure law is evidence that, perhaps 
because of the exclusionary sanction, law enforcement agencies are equip-
ping their officers to "do the right thing." 
3. Exceptions to the exclusionary rule have eliminated some of the causes for 
police officers' discontent. In cases in which officers have acted reasonably 
and in good faith, or in which evidence would have been discovered eventu-
ally by lawful means, the police are not "punished" by excluding the evi-
dence. 
4. The "cost" to the police officer of the exclusionary rule is about right. Be-
cause officers care about the outcome of the cases they investigate, and be-
cause they care about preventing, detecting, and punishing criminal behavior, 
they continue to enforce the law aggressively, but not recklessly. Increasing 
the personal cost to officers, by imposing punitive damages, fines, or criminal 
punishment, would result in less aggressive, and less effective police work.45 
Not surprisingly, proponents of the rule find its benefits much weightier than 
those who oppose it. The proponents' arguments can usually be distilled to the 
assertion that the exclusionary rule effectively prevents many illegal searches and 
seizures, and that other methods of deterrence are ineffective or too costly, or 
both. 
42 See Dressler (note 29) at 333-334. 
43 See. Stuntz (note 37) at 448. 
44 See Lafave/lsrael (note 4) at§ 3.1(c) (2d ed. 1992). 
45 See Stuntz (note 37) at 445-446. 
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Perhaps the most effective, but difficult to prove argument made by the advocates 
of exclusion is that the benefits are systemic.46 One observer has summarized this 
goal as follows: 
The exclusionary rule is meant to deter unconstitutional police conduct by promot-
ing professionalism within the ranks, specifically by creating an incentive for police 
departments to hire individuals sensitive to civil liberties, to better train officers in 
the proper use of force, to keep officers updated on constitutional law, and to de-
velop internal guidelines that reduce the likelihood of unreasonable arrests and 
searches. 4 7 
Police training, discipline, and other indicia of "professionalism" have increased 
greatly in the years since the adoption of the exclusionary rule.48 Concern that 
convictions will be lost pervades the system ofprosecution,49 and while some of-
ficers and courts may respond by finding ways to circumvent the rule, the result 
also is that officers take more care and evaluate more thoroughly before conduct-
ing a search or seizure, and that they are forced to learn and understand the laws 
they apply in order to avoid exclusion.50 When an officer decides not to act un-
constitutionally, the exclusionary rule has had its desired effect, but it is not an 
effect that any empirical study will be able to measure. These systemic benefits 
result in much greater protection for innocent citizens than holding the police civ-
illy liable for damages or imposing administrative punishments. 5I 
Alternative deterrents to police misconduct, while sometimes effective, cannot 
replace the exclusionary rule in the American system. Constitutional violations 
seldom damage citizens in ways that are easily compensable by money.52 Even 
where damages are assessed against an officer, he or she is unlikely to be able to 
pay a significant judgment. 
46 See Dressler (note 29) at 331. 
47 See Dressler (note 29) at 331. 
48 See Dressler (note 29) at 331; Stuntz (note 37) at 448. 
49 Remember that state prosecutors in the United States are elected or, less often, appointed 
by elected officials. Consequently, they constantly worry about the conviction rates earned 
by their offices, or about losing a conviction in a highly publicized prosecution. 
50 Professor Yale Kamisar has noted that, contrary to the expressed concerns of members of 
the law enforcement community, the exclusionary rule does not change the basic constitu-
tional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure; it only provides a remedy for 
violations. As he summarized this position: "If the police feared that evidence they were 
gathering in the customary manner would now be excluded by the courts, the police must 
have been violating the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure all along." Ka-
misar (note 16) at 11-12. 
51 See Lafave/lsrae/ (note 4) at § 3.1 (b). 
52 See Lafave/lsrae/ (note 4) at§ 3.1(b); Stuntz (note 37) at 449-450. 
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Administrative discipline for police misconduct is also a useful deterrent, but in 
America it will never be sufficient. Unlike most countries, America has a system 
of federalism that guarantees each governmental subdivision the right to maintain 
its own police force. Consequently, in any given city within the United States, it 
would be quite common to find 20 or 30 or more local, county, state, and federal 
law enforcement agencies working independently, each with its own internal rules 
and procedures, training, and discipline. In this environment, it will never be pos-
sible, as it may be possible in a single, federal law enforcement system, to effec-
tively eliminate police misconduct through administrative measures. 
Proponents of the exclusionary rule also continue to argue that "judicial integrity" 
supports its use. If a court cannot approve an unconstitutional search before it 
takes place, how can a court approve that same search after the fact by admitting 
the evidence it produced?53 To admit evidence obtained illegally is for the gov-
ernment, through its courts, to enjoy the fruits of the illegality at the same time it 
purports to disapprove of it. 
An example sometimes used to illustrate this irony is that of the father who has 
been to the grocery store with his young child. After they leave the store, the fa-
ther notices that the child has candy that the father knows he did not purchase. 
What should the good parent do? He can take the candy from the child, explain 
why it is wrong to take something from a store without paying for it, and make the 
child return the candy to the store and apologize for taking it. Or, instead the fa-
ther could take the candy from the child, explain why it is wrong to take some-
thing from a store without paying for it, and then unwrap the candy and eat it in 
front of the child. When courts make use of illegally obtained evidence, they act 
like the father who lectures his child about doing the right thing, and then eats the 
candy.54 
53 Kamisar (note 16) at 7. As Professor Yale Kamisar observed: The courts, after all, are the 
specific addressees of the constitutional command that 'no Warrants shall issue, but upon' 
certain prescribed conditions, and if 'not even an order of court would have justified' the 
police action, ... then 'much less was it within [the officers'] authority' to proceed on their 
own ... ld. 
See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) Gudges who admit illegally obtained 
evidence are "accomplices in the wilful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to 
uphold"). 
54 Professor Akhil Reed Amar apparently would respond that governments do keep stolen 
goods and other kinds of contraband; therefore, the government does profit from these 
wrongs and the thief or wrongful possessor is not entitled to have back or control the prop-
erty. See Amar (note 12) at 462-463 . Professor Amar's analogy is incomplete, however, 
because in his example the government engaged in no wrongdoing. In exclusion cases, the 
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Opponents of the exclusionary rule fmd this rationale difficult to accept. 55 They 
often remind us that the rule applies only in criminal cases, and not in civil cases, 
as proof that judicial integrity cannot support the exclusionary rule. 56 This incon-
sistency, however, argues as much in favor of extending the rule to the American 
civil system as it does to eliminating it from the criminal system. 
Displaying a rare interest in comparative law, opponents of the exclusionary rule 
also note that, while other legal systems exclude unreliable or irrelevant evidence, 
they usually have no rule comparable to the American rule regarding search and 
seizure. 57 This fact, the opponents argue, undermines the integrity justification 
because all of those other systems surely cannot be operating immorally.58 
Their argument, however, only distracts us from a legitimate issue. The criminal 
justice systems of countries not employing an exclusionary rule cannot, by that 
fact alone, be characterized as "immoral" any more than the American system can 
be said to be "moral" simply because it has such a rule. Recalling the example of 
the father dealing with a ch~ld who has stolen candy, it might be said, not that the 
father is moral or immoral because of what he decides to do, but that he teaches 
morality more effectively by returning the candy to the store. 
Whatever the virtues of the judicial integrity argument, it has fallen out of vogue 
in America. 59 Perhaps this deference to deterrence as the "prime purpose"60 of the 
exclusionary rule is due to the practical difficulties inherent in adhering to the in-
tegrity rationale.6I Taking seriously the judicial integrity basis for exclusion 
would require courts to extend the reach of the rule to civil cases, and to eliminate 
government, like the drug possessor, has obtained something in an illegal way. For the 
same reasons the drug possessor has no right to control the drug, the government should 
have no right to use and control the thing it possesses illegally. 
55 See A mar (note 12) at 462. 
56 See A mar (note 12) at 462; Dressler (note 29) at 324. 
57 See Kaplan (note 7) at 1031. 
58 See A mar (note 12) at 462 ("(O]ther countries with judicial systems characterized by integ-
rity do not exclude evidence."). 
59 Professor Joshua Dressler notes: "Since Mapp was decided ... the Supreme Court has de-
emphasized the judicial integrity justification of the exclusionary rule to the point of prac-
tical extinction". Dressler (note 29) at 324. 
60 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,446 (1976); see Dressler (note 29) at 324. 
61 See Dressler (note 29) at 324; see also Lafave/Jsrae/ (note 4) at§ 3.1(B) (Supreme Court 
has never taken judicial integrity "to be so important that the rule must be unqualified"). 
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the exceptions the Supreme Court has recognized in criminal cases.62 It might 
render the rule too inflexible to be accepted by the public. 
In recent years the Supreme Court has not expanded the scope of the exclusionary 
rule; rather, it has made it less available and diminished its reach. By the same 
token, the Court has not eliminated the rule, and it seems now to be a fixture of 
the American criminal justice system. Whatever the future of the exclusionary 
rule in America may be, it stands as an extraordinary on-going experiment in 
modifying the behavior of the police, an experiment not without its successes. 
It is not clear that the successes of the American exclusionary rule can be obtained 
in other criminal justice systems, but it is certain that at least some of the costs 
and benefits would differ from those seen in the United States. In a system with a 
single federal police force, it may be possible to achieve the same benefits through 
increased training and uniform disciplinary procedures. Other cultures may be 
more or less willing than the American public to tolerate the "costs" associated 
with an exclusionary rule, and the "benefits" derived from a rule may be valued 
much differently. Notwithstanding these obstacles to comparison, the American 
experience with exclusion remains an important example that may guide others 
pursuing the laudable goals the exclusionary rule is designed to achieve. 
62 As Dressler notes: "The concept of judicial integrity potentially functions as a moral im-
perative - 'thou shalt not be an accessory to an illegal act' - and, as such, does not seem to 
allow for cost-benefit analysis of the exclusionary rule." Jd. 
